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NOTES
SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF COGNIZABLE
GROUPS BY USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
I. Introduction
An integral component of the jury selection process' is the individ-
ual challenge.2 A party who invokes the challenge removes a potential
juror from the jury venire. 3 An attorney calls on the challenge privi-
lege to remove potential jurors when, in the attorney's opinion, the
juror cannot deliver a fair and impartial decision because he or she
appears to be biased against the defendant, the prosecution or the
case. 4
In the United States there are two conventional types of challenges. 5
The first is the challenge for cause. This challenge, based "on a
narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partial-
1. A concise overview of jury selection procedures is located in Simon &
Marshall, The Jury System, in THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN LAW AND ACTION,
214-16 (S. Nagel ed. 1972). The jury selection process begins with the summoning of
prospective jurors. Names are compiled, at random, from lists containing representa-
tive samplings of the population. In the past, lists frequently relied upon were found,
among other places, in telephone directories, city directories, and on the rolls of the
taxpayer-property owner lists. Now, jurors are summoned more frequently from lists
of registered voters. These citizens, who must report for jury service when sum-
moned, form what is known as the jury panel or venire. The petit juries, which will
hear the cases scheduled for the trial term, are selected from the jury panels.
To select the petit juries, a jury officer randomly selects names from those on the
panel. Each prospective juror is then subjected to examination during the voir dire
stage of the selection proceeding. The underlying reasons for examining the juror are
to determine his or her desire to sit as a juror, and whether the juror will be able to
view the facts objectively. Such willingness and ability is determined through ques-
tions concerned with the potential juror's background, awareness of the case, rela-
tionship with any of the parties, and attitude towards facts and legal principles that
are involved in the case. Id.
2. J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO'
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 139 (1977). An individual challenge is a "remed[y] for re-
moving objectionable jurors." M. BLOOMSTEIN, VERDICT: THE JURY SYSTEM 62 (1968).
A non-individual challenge is one directed at the jury panel and is asserted when the
panel has been improperly selected. Id. In New York, only the defendant may
challenge the panel. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.10(1) (McKinney 1982). The
challenge must be made on the ground that the panel was selected in a manner that
deviated so much from the requirements enunciated by the judiciary law in the
drawing or return of the panel that the defendant faced substantial prejudice. Id.
3. The jury venire is the panel of citizens assembled from which the petit jury
which will hear the case is selected. See note 1 supra.
4. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 139.
5. Id.
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ity," 6 is enumerated by statute. 7 The second type of challenge is the
peremptory challenge. 8 This challenge has been defined by the Su-
preme Court as one "without cause, without explanation and without
judicial scrutiny .... ,,9
Peremptory challenges may be used to remove jurors who possess a
bias peculiar to the immediate case, but whose bias is not articulable
in terms of a challenge for cause. 10 The underlying partiality, how-
ever, is not necessarily as apparent as that which is delineated in the
forcause statutes."l Permitting the use of peremptories is an acknowl-
edgment that the challenges for cause do not cover every instance
where a potential juror may demonstrate bias.
Recognizing the potentially subjective nature of the peremptory
challenge, and considering the problems of infinite delays and finite
jury pools,12 legislatures have limited the number of peremptories that
each side may exercise. 13 Limiting the number of peremptories serves
6. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
7. Some of the causes listed in some statutes are: a close degree of affinity or
consanguinity to the defendant, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(c) (McKinney
1982); Cal. Penal Code § 1074 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983), having served as a juror in
a substantially similar action involving the same defendant, id., and having sat on
the grand jury which found the indictment, N.Y. CuM. PRoc. LAW § 270.20(1)(e)
(McKinney 1982); Cal. Penal Code § 1074 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983).
8. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 139. The peremptory challenge has existed in
at least three variations. The traditional method is described by Van Dyke. "After all
prospective jurors who have displayed any overt bias are challenged for cause, each
litigant is permitted a certain number of peremptory challenges, which can be used
to remove those jurors who are believed for some reason or another to favor the other
side." Id. at 145.
The state of Alabama, at the time of Swain, had a system which varied only by
degree. In Alabama's struck jury system, "[a]fter excuses and removals for cause, the
venire in a capital case is reduced to about 75. The jury is then 'struck'-the defense
striking two veniremen and the prosecution one in alternating turns, until only 12
jurors remain." 380 U.S. at 210 (citing ALA. CODE tit. 30, §§ 54, 60 (1958)).
In England, the prosecution has the right to exercise a limited type of peremptory
challenge called "standing aside." Id. at 213. The prosecution is allowed "to direct
any juror after examination to 'stand aside' until the entire panel was gone over and
the defendant had exercised his challenges; only if there was a deficiency of jurors in
the box at that point did the Crown have to show cause in respect to jurors recalled to
make up the required number." Id. See Mansell v. The Queen, 8 El. & BI. 54, 108-
09, 120 Eng. Rep. 20, 40 (1857).
9. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 212.
10. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 146.
11. Id. at 140.
12. See M. BLOOMSTEIN, supra note 2, at 64: "such challenges could be made to
every juror, and a lawyer whose party was not particularly eager to go to trial could
indefinitely delay matters."
13. All states have statutes which set the number of peremptory challenges for
the prosecution and defense in criminal cases, and for the plaintiff and defendant in
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at least two functions: it prevents an attorney from avoiding the trial
by forever removing jurors;1 4 and, it forces an attorney to use his
peremptories wisely, by weighing the bias demonstrated by a poten-
tial juror against the potential bias of one who has not yet been subject
to voir dire. 15
The limiting statutes, however, have failed to eliminate all abuses
of peremptory challenges.' 6 There have been numerous claims of
systematic dismissals based solely on the juror's affiliation with certain
cognizable groups. These groups include race,17 sex,' 8 ethnic origin, 9
and religion. 20 Some defendants complaining against such use of the
peremptory challenge have asserted equal protection violations. 2'
More recently, defendants have relied on state and federal require-
ments that a jury be impartial and that the jury panel represent a fair
cross-section of the community.22 Proponents of an unabridged right
to exercise peremptory challenges, on the other hand, argue that both
civil actions. A table which serves as a useful guide to the distribution of peremptory
challenges in all state and federal courts appears in J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 282
app. A majority of states grant the same number of peremptory challenges to the
prosecution and the defense. Id.
14. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
15. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 146.
16. The claim that peremptories have been misused has frequently been made in
federal courts, see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 663 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1981)
(the defendant claimed that no blacks sat on his jury because the prosecutor discrimi-
natorily used peremptory challenges); Hampton v. Wyrick, 606 F.2d 834, 835 (8th
Cir. 1979) (defendant alleged that peremptory challenges were used in a discrimina-
tory manner), and in state courts, see, e.g., State v. Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 376-77,
222 S.E.2d 222, 225 (1976) (defendant alleged that the district attorney peremptorily
challenged all prospective black jurors); Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289,
295, 336 A.2d 290, 293 (1975) (defendant asserted that the prosecutor prevented
blacks from sitting on the petit jury by discriminatorily exercising his peremptory
challenges).
17. Jones, 663 F.2d at 572; Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 222 S.E.2d 222.
18. Marquez v. State, 91 Nev. 471, 538 P.2d 156 (1975).
19. State v. Salinas, 87 Wash. 2d 112, 549 P.2d 712 (1976).
20. People v. Kagan, 101 Misc. 2d 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1979).
21. Swain, 380 U.S. 202, 221.
22. People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1036, 1042, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1047,
1052 (1982) (defendant contended that the state frustrated his right to a jury drawn
from a fair cross-section of the community and that therefore he was denied his sixth
amendment rights); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 473, 387 N.E.2d 499,
508, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) (defendants alleged that the prosecutor effec-
tively deprived them of a fair trial and impartial jury); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d
258, 263, 583 P.2d 748, 752, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 893 (1978) (defendants claimed that
their right to an impartial jury was violated).
1983]
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the traditional role of the peremptory challenge,2 3 and the 1965 Su-
preme Court decision in Swain v. Alabama2 4 support their view.
This Note will trace the origins of the peremptory challenge and the
history of its use. It will then review Supreme Court decisions estab-
lishing the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury under both
the sixth2 5 and fourteenth amendments. 2 After an examination of the
Swain decision, there follows a discussion of cases which have circum-
vented or rejected the rule in Swain because of the sixth amendment's
application to the individual states. Finally, this Note recommends a
synthesis of criteria proposed by several sources to establish a more just
standard for determining systematic exclusion.
II. The Evolution of Peremptory Challenges
A. Historical Background
Peremptory challenges are firmly entrenched in the Anglo-Ameri-
can history of trial by jury. 27 Originally peremptories were reserved
solely for the Crown. 28 By the Fourteenth Century, however, the right
to exercise peremptory challenges had been granted to defendants. 29
23. See, e.g., Swain, 380 U.S. at 212-21 (the nature of peremptory challenges in
and of itself justifies the removal of any group of jurors although in all other respects,
the group members are qualified jurors).
24. 380 U.S. 202; see, e.g., People v. Teague, 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 897, 439 N.E.
2d 1066, 1070 (1982).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed .... "). Since the sixth amendment applies only
to criminal trials and not to civil actions, the scope of this Note is limited to
systematic exclusion occurring at criminal trials.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "nor shall any State ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
27. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 212-21 for a discussion of the history of
peremptory challenges.
28. See L. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 35 (1973).
The Crown's original right to peremptory challenges may have evolved from William
the Conqueror's inquests into the laws of England and the value of certain properties
after his victory at the Battle of Hastings in 1066. "The king's justices summoned a
jury in every county .... " Id. "The sheriffs were given complete charge of selecting
persons to sit on the panel." Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors;
A Constitutional Right," 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 290, 292 (1972). Van Dyke has noted
that the early English juries were in effect hand-picked by the Crown or its allies. If
an unacceptable juror appeared on the jury list, the Crown could resort to its
unlimited number of peremptory challenges to remove the juror. J. VAN DYKE, supra
note 2, at 147.
29. Although the origins of the defendant's right to peremptory challenges are
not clear, some authorities refer to the defendant's early right. E.g., J. VAN DYKE,
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In 1305, after recognizing that the Crown's exercise of peremptory
challenges was resulting in "infinite delays and danger," 30 Parliament
completely revoked the Crown's right to use peremptory challenges. 31
To this day defendants in England have continued. to enjoy the right
of peremptory challenges, while peremptories have never been re-
stored to the Crown.32
Both state and federal courts in the United States have long ac-
knowledged the right of a defendant to make peremptory chal-
lenges. 33 Until the late Nineteenth Century, however, few jurisdic-
tions recognized a prosecutorial right to exercise peremptory
challenges.3 4 During the 1800's state legislatures began granting to the
states the right to exercise peremptory challenges, 35 and by the early
Twentieth Century, peremptory challenges for both sides was the
general rule. 36 In 1827, the Supreme Court decision in United States
v. Marchant37 opened the door for acceptance of the prosecutorial
supra note 2, at 147 (after 1305 "criminal defendants were ...still allowed to
challenge jurors peremptorily").
30. COKE ON LIrLErON 156 (14th ed. 1791) (cited in Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. at 213). An early New York Court of Appeals case noted that the 1305 statute
was enacted to prevent the king from causing unjust harm to the accused. People v.
McQuade, 110 N.Y. 284, 293, 18 N.E. 156, 159 (1888).
31. 33 Edw. 1 Stat. 4 (1305) (if "they that sue for the King will challenge...
jurors, they shall assign ...a cause certain ...").
32. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 148. The right to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges in England has never been restored to the prosecution. See note 7 supra.
33. A defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges in federal court was
granted by a federal statute in 1790. 1 Stat. 119 (1790). The Supreme Court observed
that defendants in state courts were given peremptory challenges by state statutes
early in United States history. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 215 & n.16 (1965);
see Brown v. State, 62 N.J.L. 666, 678-88, 42 A. 811, 814-18, aff'd, 175 U.S. 172
(1899); People v. McQuade, 110 N.Y. 284, 293, 18 N.E. 156, 158 (1888). The
defendant's right at common law to exercise peremptory challenges was recognized
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 481
(1827).
34. The Supreme Court recognized that after the Statute of 1305, the prosecuto-
rial peremptory challenge was not a part of the English law. United States v.
Marchant, 25 U.S.(12 Wheat.) at 483. The Court was also cognizant of the Crown's
right to stand jurors aside, id., and implied that this right had "prevailed" to become
part of the common law. Id. at 484. The federal government did not specifically
authorize a prosecutorial peremptory challenge until 1865. 13 Stat. 500 (1865). This
statute granted to the United States five peremptory challenges in treason cases and
two challenges for other offenses. Id. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 214-15.
State statutes granting the governments a right to exercise peremptory challenges
were first passed in the 1840's, but most states did not recognize the government's
right to peremptory challenges until the second half of the Nineteenth Century. Id. at
216 n. 18.
35. 380 U.S. at 216.
36. Id.
37. 25 U.S.(12 Wheat.) 480 (1827).
1983]
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peremptory challenge in the federal courts. 38 The government's right
to exercise peremptory challenges in federal courts is now well estab-
lished .3
B. Jury Selection Procedures and the Issue of Jury Impartiality
The creation, limitation, and, more recently, the expansion of the
right to make peremptory challenges have all been responses to an
imbalance in the jury selection process. 40 The search for an equitable
balance has characterized the history of peremptory challenges.
Throughout the development of the peremptory challenge, the right
to exercise such challenge has been qualified over time to prevent
either side from gaining an unfair advantage. The ultimate goal of
this dynamic process, ideally, has been to promote justice through the
selection of impartial jurors.
The importance of maintaining jury impartiality has been empha-
sized by the Supreme Court in decisions which commended the jury's
independence from special influence and its role as representative of
the community. In Smith v. Texas, 41 the Supreme Court declared that
the jury should be "a body truly representative of the community. 42
In a subsequent case, the Court praised the jury's role as a "shield
against oppression. '' 43 The oppression guarded against is the domi-
38. In Marchant the Supreme Court ruled that the British government's right to
"stand aside" jurors had been inherited by the United States courts at common law.
See note 34 supra. In 1840 Congress passed a statute which required jurors hearing
cases in the federal courts to have the same qualifications and granted to them the
same exemptions as the jurors in the state courts in which the United States court was
located. 5 Stat. 394 (1840). The Supreme Court interpreted this statute as limiting
the number of peremptory challenges in federal court to those challenges allowed by
the relevant state court, and to those peremptory challenges specifically granted to
the defendant by 1 Stat. 119 (1790). United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
588, 590 (1855). See note 34 supra.
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (grants the right to the defense and prosecution in civil
cases); FED. R. CRiM. P. 24 (b), (c) (prescribes peremptory challenges to the defend-
ant and federal government in criminal cases).
40. In 1887 the Supreme Court accepted the notion that the protections of an
impartial jury apply to both the accused and the prosecution. "Between [the defend-
ant] and the state the scales are to be evenly held." Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70
(1887).
41. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
42. Id. at 130. (In Smith, a conviction was reversed because the Texas method of
selecting jurors for the grand jury, although not discriminatory on its face, was
"applied in such manner as practically to proscribe any group thought by the law's
administrators to be undesirable." Id. at 131. From 1931 through 1938, only 5 of 384
grand jurors in Texas' Harris County were black, although 20% of the population
was black. Id. at 129.
43. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 84 (1942).
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nance of any private group or special class from which a jury would
be selected. 44 The possibility that a defendant would be convicted by
an unrepresentative jury was considered to be of such pressing concern
that the Court has commanded that "[t]endencies, no matter how
slight" 45 which impinge on choosing a jury that is representative of the
community "should be sturdily resisted." 46
The early constitutional challenges to jury selection procedures in
the state courts were based on fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion arguments. In Strauder v. West Virginia,47 a state statute limiting
jury service to white males was found to violate the fourteenth amend-
ment. 48 Twenty years later in Carter v. Texas,49 the Supreme Court
ruled that the state of Texas violated the equal protection clause by
prohibiting a defendant from offering proof that blacks were excluded
from the grand jury solely on account of their race. 50 The Supreme
Court in Carter condemned "any action of a state [which excluded] all
persons of the African race . . solely because of their race or
color." 5 In 1935, the Court relied on Carter in ruling that a defend-
ant's equal protection rights are denied when blacks are prohibited
from serving on petit juries. 52
44. Id. at 86 (the jury should not be "the organ of any special group or class"). In
Glasser, the defendants appealed from convictions for conspiring to defraud the
United States. Id. at 63. The defendants contended that the deliberate exclusion of
women who were not members of the Illinois League of Women voters from serving
as petit jurors deprived the defendants of an impartial jury. Id. at 82.
45. Id. at 86.
46. Id.
47. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
48. Id. The West Virginia statute read "[a]ll white male persons who are twenty-
one years of age and who are citizens of the State shall be liable to serve as ju-
rors ..... Id. at 305 (citing Acts of 1872-73, at 102, enacted March 12, 1873). The
defendant, who was on trial for murder, contended that this statute deprived him of
the full and equal benefit of the law by making all black men ineligible for jury
service. Id. at 304.
49. 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
50. Id. The defendant claimed that the jury commissioners responsible for select-
ing the grand jury to hear evidence against the defendant excluded from the list of
grand jurors all persons of African descent. Id. at 444.
51. Carter, 177 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added).
52. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). The Court ruled that the principle
asserted in Carter "is equally applicable to a similar exclusion of negroes from service
on petit juries." Id. at 589.
The Supreme Court cited the requirements for a prima facie case of discrimination
in the jury selection process in Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954). The prima
facie case is established when (1) the group allegedly discriminated against is a
"substantial segment of the population"; (2) some members of the group were "quali-
fied to serve as jurors"; and (3) "none had been called for jury service over an
1983] 933
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C. Swain: A regression
Despite a number of decisions demonstrating its conviction that an
impartial jury is crucial to equal protection, the Court in Swain v.
Alabama5 3 deviated from this line of cases by showing a greater
concern for less restricted access to peremptory challenges. 54 In Swain,
the Court afforded more protection to the prosecutor's right to make
peremptory challenges than to the defendant's constitutionally guar-
anteed right to equal protection under the law. The petitioner in
Swain raised a motion to void the petit jury selected to try his case. 55
Although all six blacks on the venire were struck from the petit jury5
the Court held that the exercise of peremptory challenges against
blacks in any individual case is not a denial of equal protection of the
laws 57 The petitioner also pointed out that no black had ever sat on a
petit jury in the county. 58 Moreover, it was contended that, in crimi-
nal cases, prosecutors had methodically relied on their strikes to sys-
tematically exclude all blacks on jury venires from serving as petit
jurors. 59 The Supreme Court agreed that such systematic exclusion can
be the basis of an equal protection violation. 60 The Court, however,
extended period of time." This three-part test has been coined "the rule of exclusion."
Id. at 480. The rule has been used frequently since its inception to prevent systematic
exclusion of cognizable groups of potential jurors from various aspects of jury service.
See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 696 F.2d 1239, 1240-41 (9th Cir. 1983) (to show
that an equal protection violation in the context of grand jury selection has occurred,
the defendant must resort to the "method of proof, sometimes called the 'rule of
exclusion' " (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977)); Hillery v.
Pulley, 533 F. Supp. 1189, 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (prima facie case of systematic
exclusion of members of defendant's race from the grand jury is established if the
requirements of the rule of exclusion are met).
53, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
54. Id. This inclination has been followed many times since Swain. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jones, 663 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1981); Hampton v. Wyrick, 606
F.2d 834 (8th Cir. 1979); People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915, 457
N.Y.S.2d 441 (1982); People v. Teague, 108 Ill. App. 3d 891, 439 N.E.2d 1066
(1982).
55. 380 U.S. at 203.
56. Id. at 210.
57. Id. at 221-22. The Court argued that subjecting the peremptory challenge to
the standards of the equal protection clause would radically change the nature and
function of the challenge. The challenge would cease being peremptory; every chal-
lenge would be subject to review, either when exercised, or at a subsequent hearing.
The prosecutor's judgment would be open to evaluation. The Court feared that as a
result many uses of the challenges would be prohibited. Id. at 222.
58. Id. at 222-23.
59. Id. at 223.
60. Id. at 223. The Supreme Court spelled out the requisite scenario for system-
atic exclusion.
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held that the petitioner's motion did not evince, with satisfactory
precision, "when, how often, and under, what circumstances"' the
prosecutor himself was responsible for excluding those blacks who
appeared on petit jury venires, and therefore did not show the requi-
site "purposeful discrimination." 62 Thus, no constitutional violation
was found.
D. Duncan and Taylor: A new perspective
Swain is the leading Supreme Court decision on the question of
whether the improper use of peremptories is a violation of the equal
protection clause. 3 Swain was decided three years before the Supreme
Court decided in Duncan v. Louisiana6 4 that the sixth amendment
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. After
Duncan, a defendant in state court is able to assert that his right to an
impartial jury is violated without relying on an equal protection
claim. 5 With the right to an impartial jury established as a constitu-
tional right, subsequent decisions actually defined the scope of that
But when the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the
circumstances whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the
victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been
selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have sur-
vived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on
petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on added significance.
Id.
61. Id. at 224.
62. Id. at 226.
63. See, e.g. United States v. Jones, 663 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1981) (the court
described Swain v. Alabama as "controlling Supreme Court authority"); Hampton v.
Wyrick, 606 F.2d 834, 834-35 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1022 (1980)
(appellant failed to meet the standards set forth in Swain); People v. Teague, 108 Ill.
App. 3d 891, 897, 439 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (1982) (the court embraced Swain, and
said that Payne holding "effectively emasculated" the function of the peremptory
challenge which was recognized by Swain); People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 549,
443 N.E.2d 915, 919, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 445 (1982) ("[w]e find no compelling basis
for rejecting the holding of the Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama ").
64. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Defendant was convicted by a judge after his request for
a jury trial was denied. The Louisiana Constitution guaranteed a jury trial only in
cases in which the punishment could be hard labor or death. Defendant, who faced a
maximum punishment of two years imprisonment and a fine contended that the sixth
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution assured him of a jury
trial for a criminal prosecution in state court. Id. at 146-47. The Court ruled that
"the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases
which -were they to be tried in a federal court -would come within the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee." Id. at 149.
65. The defendants in Strauder, Carter, Hernandez, Swain, etc. presumably
would be availed of this new constitutional protection. See notes 47-54 supra and
accompanying text.
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right. Taylor v. Louisiana" was a significant development in this
direction.
In Taylor, the Court condemned the practice of excluding from the
jury panel women who did not request in writing to be selected for the
panel as a violation of the defendant's sixth amendment rights. 7 The
Court asserted that a petit jury must be selected from a representative
cross-section of the community. 8 The cross-section requirement was
held to be an "essential component" ' 9 of the Constitution because the
jury is supposed to represent the "commonsense judgment of the
community. '70 The Court stated that jury pools composed of special
segments of the community, or lacking an identifiable group, will
damage the public's faith in the fairness of the criminal justice proc-
ess. 71
The Supreme Court has not decided whether the guidelines for
determining a sixth amendment claim based on the alleged discrimi-
natory use of peremptories are the same as for determining a similar
fourteenth amendment claim. Defendants, nevertheless, have relied
on the synergism of the Duncan and Taylor decisions in challenging
the states' use of peremptory challenges, apparently hoping that the
sixth amendment will provide them greater protection than the four-
teenth.72 Most courts have spurned the opportunity to decide the issue
and have ruled strictly in favor of the unbridled peremptory chal-
lenge .73
In addition, courts in two states have relied not on Taylor and
Duncan but on their own state constitutions to condemn the system-
atic exclusion practiced by way of peremptory challenges. In Com-
monwealth v. Soares,74 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that if the state constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community is to be more than "hollow
66. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 528. The Court held that "[w]e accept the fair-cross section require-
ment as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment .... Id.
at: 530.
69. Id. at 528.
70. Id. at 530.
71. Id.
72. See People v. Teague, 108 11. App. 3d 891, 439 N.E.2d 1066 (1982); People
v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1042, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1052 (1982).
73. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Futch, 492 Pa. 359, 368 424 A.2d 1231, 1235
(1981) (the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to decide whether Pennsylvania
should abandon the Swain standards).
74. 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
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words" the peremptory challenge must not be exercised with "unbri-
dled discretion. '7 5 In People v. Wheeler,76 the California Supreme
Court borrowed from Swain in announcing a rebuttable presumption
that peremptories are exercised within constitutional limits. However,
the hurdles for rebutting the presumption are lower under California
law than they are under federal law. In California, a prima facie
rebuttal of the presumption is established when the defendant demon-
strates a "strong likelihood" that the jurors' exclusion was based on
group association, rather than on specific bias. 77
The motivation behind these state court decisions has been a desire
to promote impartial juries.78 The high courts of Massachusetts and
California both appear to recognize the conflicting signals in Swain
and Taylor. Without a clearer statement by the Supreme Court,
however, these innovative state courts have felt compelled to rely
solely on their own state constitutions to prohibit systematic exclu-
sion. 79
The Illinois Court of Appeals, however, has relied directly on the
decisions in Duncan and Taylor to infer a greater protection against
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges than was afforded in
Swain. 0 In Payne, six of the eight peremptory challenges allocated to
the prosecution were employed against six of seven blacks on the jury
venire 1  The Payne court determined that the prosecutor systemati-
cally excluded the blacks from the jury and that the defendant's right
75. Id. at 484, 387 N.E.2d at 514.
76. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
77. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. See notes 121-28 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Wheeler approach.
78. The Soares and Wheeler courts described the defendant's trial right using
strong terms. "The right to a fair and impartial jury is one of the most sacred and
important guaranties of the constitution." Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 283, 583 P.2d at
766, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 907, (quoting People v. Riggins, 159 Cal. 113, 120, 112 P. 862,
865 (1910)). The Massachusetts Court deemed the defendant's rights to be tried by a
jury composed of a representative cross-section of the community as "critical."
Soares, 377 Mass. at 479, 387 N.E.2d at 511.
79. See Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979) (article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution
proscribes the use of peremptory challenges to systematically exclude jurors on the
basis of their group membership; a failure to read the Massachusetts Constitution this
way would subject the representative cross-section rule to nullification); People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 287, 583 P.2d 748, 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 909-10 (1978)
(the court ruled that in California courts all claims that peremptory challenges are
being exercised discriminatorily will be governed by art. I, § 16 of the CAL. CONST.).
80. People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982).
81. Id. at 1044, 436 N.E.2d at 1053-54.
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to an impartial jury selected from a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity was "affirmatively frustrate[d]." 8 2 Thus, the court accepted the
defendant's contention that the prosecutor's employment of peremp-
tory challenges violated his sixth amendment rights.8 3
III. Comparing the Case Law
The facts and ruling of Taylor v. Louisiana84 apply specifically to
the jury panel from which the petit jury is selected85 while Swain was
decided with reference to the composition of the petit jury.8 The
Supreme Court has defined the criteria for a violation of the cross-
section rule only with regard to the jury panel. In Duren v. Missouri87
the Supreme Court outlined a test for determining a prima facie cross-
section violation. When the defendant shows that a "distinctive" seg-
ment of the community is unfairly and unreasonably represented on
the jury panel because of systematic exclusion,88 the state must dem-
onstrate that the fair cross-section requirement in the particular case is
inconsistent with a "significant state interest."8' 9 Presumably this test
would not apply effectively to the petit jury because it would be
extremely difficult to reasonably reflect the many groups in a hetero-
geneous community on a twelve person jury. 90 At least two states,
however, have established a standard based on state constitutions for
defining a fair cross-section on the petit jury. In California, a defend-
ant is constitutionally entitled to a petit jury composed of a cross-
section of the community which approximates that jury which would
have been selected by a random draw.9 ' The Massachusetts courts
share this view.92
82. Id. at 1045-46, 436 N.E.2d at 1054.
83. Id.
84. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
85. Id. at 524.
86. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209 (1965).
87. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
88. Id. at 364. In Duren the petitioner was indicted for first degree murder. Id.
at 360. He successfully challenged his conviction on the ground that while 54 % of the
adult inhabitants in the county of his trial were women, only 15.5 % of the prospec-
tive jurors on his panel were women. Id. at 362-63.
89. Id. at 368.
90. The Supreme Court apparently recognized the difficulty in reflecting the
entire community on the petit jury. Therefore the Supreme Court "impose[d] no
requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community .. "
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538. Instead the Court insisted that the jury panels be reasonably
representative of the "distinctive groups in the community." Id.
91. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 277, 583 P.2d 748, 762, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 903 (1978).
92. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 488, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516 (1979).
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The Supreme Court has not decided what effect the fair cross-
section requirement will have either on petit jury selection or the
Swain standard governing peremptory challenges. A number of au-
thorities, however, have been highly critical of the rigid Swain stan-
dard. The standard has been condemned as being "overly harsh and
unmanageably vague."' 3 One commentator wrote that "White's 'pur-
poseful discrimination test'9 4 ladens the negro defendant with almost
impossible burdens."9 5 Still another posited that the Swain burden
"seems an impossible one for the defendant to carry." ' Van Dyke
noted that "the burden of proof . . . can be sustained only if the
accused has an associate sitting in courtrooms throughout the area
over a long period of time . . . ,,17 Furthermore, the highest courts of
Massachusetts and California have circumvented the Swain decision
by relying on their state constitutions to find a violation of defendants'
rights by systematic exclusion.9
The Payne court asserted that no "rational difference" exists be-
tween discrimination at the venire selection stage and at the voir dire
stage. 9 The Illinois court declared that the reason for prohibiting
93. Note, Prima Facie Case Requirement in Attacking Prosecutor's Systematic
Discriminatory use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Members of Race from Jury
Service-Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), 15 AM. U.L. REV. 104, 109 (1965).
94. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
95. Comment, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322, 324 (1965).
96. Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetua-
tion of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (1966).
97. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2.
The defendant is a party only to his trial and does not have personal knowledge of
the practices at other trials. Information about the voir dire in other cases is not easily
obtainable. The cost of investigation is high, especially to indigent defendants and
the time needed for a thorough investigation may be prohibitively long. The Califor-
nia court is not aware of any "central register" which contains the names and races of
those jurors who were peremptorily challenged. The court concluded that there is no
practical method for establishing a pattern of discrimination, or even for determining
that the excluded jurors were black. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 285-86, 583 P.2d at 767-
68, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
98. See notes 74-77 supra.
99. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1036, 436 N.E.2d at 1048. See note 71 supra. Other
arguments have been made supporting this proposition. "The fair cross section-
impartiality requirement is meaningless if in any case involving a defendant of a
given race the prosecutor can intentionally and systematically exclude all members of
that race without cause." People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 554, 443 N.E.2d 915,
922, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 448 (1982) (Meyer, J., dissenting). A concurring opinion in a
Pennsylvania case declared that if the right to a representative jury is to be meaning-
ful, it is "incumbent upon this Court" to establish a test that will ban the use of
peremptory challenges based on group affiliation. Commonwealth v. Futch, 492 Pa.
359, 369, 424 A.2d 1231, 1236 (1981) (Nix, J., concurring). The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts noted that a representative venire is not sufficient by itself.
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racial discrimination when summoning prospective jurors for the jury
panel "is to prevent the State's systematic exclusion of any racial group
in the composition of the jury itself."' 00 Relying on this rationale,
Payne determined that the defendant's right to a jury composed of a
representative cross-section of the community was violated.' 0 '
The Payne decision is a bold and necessary departure from a process
of jury selection which is prone to misuse. Payne supports a system
which recognizes a fair trial as the paramount goal, and the peremp-
tory challenge as a tool to be used towards that end. 10 2 A slight
encroachment on the attorney's right to exercise unrestricted peremp-
tory challenges will facilitate the selection of impartial juries. Such an
approach is consistent with the evolution of the jury selection process
in the United States. 0 3
In the past the right to exercise peremptory challenges has been
expanded or restricted to advance the cause of a balanced impartiality
when one side was perceived as having an unfair advantage in the jury
selection process. 10 4 It is clear from an historical 0 5 and a pragmatic10 6
perspective, however, that the peremptory challenge alone does not
The desired interaction of a cross-section of the community does not occur on the
venire. The goal is effectuated only on the petit jury. Commonwealth v. Soares, 377
Mass. 461, 482, 387 N.E.2d 499, 513 (1979). The issue of applying venire stage
protections to the petit jury has roots which extend at least as far back as 1948. A
dissent in a circuit court of appeals case cautioned that the protection of the equal
protection clause against the exclusion of "Negroes from the panel has no value if all
who get on the panel may be systematically kept off the jury." Hall v. United States,
168 F.2d 161, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (Edgarton, J., dissenting).
100. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1036, 436 N.E.2d at 1048. If the petit jury is not required
to reflect the nature of the jury panel, all minority group members can be eliminated
from the jury while the majority continues to dominate. The majority is drawn from
a pool whose number is greater than the number of peremptories available to the
opposition. The same may not be true for the minority. "The result is a jury com-
posed wholly of the majority which in the context of racial differences is neither a
cross section nor impartial." Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL.
L. REV. 235 (1968).
101. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1045-46, 436 N.E.2d at 1054.
102. People v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1037, 436 N.E.2d 1046, 1048 (1982)
(no individual black juror is insulated from being peremptorily challenged, but the
state may not use peremptory challenges to frustrate the defendant's constitutional
right to a representative jury).
103. Beginning in the Nineteenth Century, and continuing throughout the Twen-
tieth Century, Supreme Court decisions have emphasized the importance of impar-
tial representative juries. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Cas-
taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
104. See notes 27-40 supra and accompanying text.
105. See note 30 supra.
106. See note 68 supra.
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guarantee impartiality. The underlying reasons for exercising the
challenge are equally important in maintaining impartiality.,0 7 The
Swain Court correctly viewed peremptory challenges as a desirable
tool to which both the prosecution and defense could resort in order to
promote an impartial decision.108 The Swain Court failed, however,
to appreciate the valuable lesson of history: when peremptories no
longer promote impartiality, the right to exercise the peremptory
challenge must be restricted. 0
After the Payne court discussed the erosion of Swain it established a
less onerous test for determining systematic exclusion. Payne proposed
that the trial judge have the authority to order the prosecutor to
explain his use of peremptory challenges when it "reasonably appears"
to the trial court that the prosecutor is systematically excluding
blacks," 110 and presumably other cognizable groups. While essentially
adopting a case by case approach, the Payne court indicated that the
trial judge should consider two factors. First, the judge should con-
sider the backgrounds of the excluded jurors."II Then, he should look
at the characteristics which distinguish the excluded jurors from the
chosen jurors. 112
The Payne standard of "reasonably appears," which was not de-
fined by the Payne court and which has yet to be construed by any
other court, lends little guidance to the courts. The determination of
whether it reasonably appears that systematic exclusion has occurred
may vary greatly from judge to judge. Without more explicit criteria,
some judges may entertain frivolous claims of systematic exclusion.
107. The fact that peremptory challenges can be exercised to eliminate the ex-
tremes of partiality does not guarantee that the device will be used in such an
exemplary manner. The successful claims of discrimination in the jury selection
process, see, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (women underrepresented
on jury panels); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (Mexican-Americans
systematically excluded from sitting as grand jurors), are indicative of attempts by
the prosecutors to manipulate the jury system not towards impartiality, but towards
the biases of select segments of society.
108. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209 (1965).
109. See notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text. Since impartiality is the ulti-
mate goal, any proposal to restrict the unfettered exercise of the peremptory must be
weighed in terms of its potential contribution or imposition upon impartiality.
110. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1040, 436 N.E.2d at 1050.
111. See id. at 1044-45, 436 N.E.2d at 1054. the court compared the backgrounds
of the excluded jurors in order to determine whether the excluded blacks shared a
common characteristic other than race. Payne determined that these excluded pro-
spective jurors were heterogeneous except for their race. Id.
112. Id. This consideration is concerned with those characteristics found in the
excluded jurors that mandated their exclusion, and which were not found in the
included jurors. "[T]he single distinguishing characteristic that the excluded blacks
shared is their race." Id. at 1045, 436 N.E.2d at 1054.
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The Payne court also did not indicate whether or not the number of
excluded jurors from the cognizable group would enter into a determi-
nation of systematic exclusion. Presumably, in Payne, this factor did
contribute as the court noted that six of seven blacks were excluded. 1 3
A strictly numerical test, however, poses serious line drawing prob-
lems for future courts.
IV. Alternative Approaches
While Payne makes commendable progress by articulating the
guidelines already mentioned," 4 it is worthwhile to consider the ap-
proaches that other sources have embraced. These alternative ap-
proaches do not necessarily solve all the questions unanswered by
Payne. Nonetheless, some of these approaches do provide worthy
considerations that, when read in conjunction with the Payne guide-
lines, create a more constructive analytical tool.
A. People v. Wheeler
In People v. Wheeler,"5 the California Supreme Court established
a three step approach that places a greater burden on the defendant
than Payne does. In California, where only the defendant can initiate
the claim of systematic exclusion, the defendant must "make as com-
plete a record of the circumstances as is feasible.""" After proving
that the persons excluded belong to a cognizable group, as recognized
by the cross-section rule," 17 the defendant "must show a strong likeli-
hood that such persons are being challenged because of their group
113. See notes 84-87 supra.
114. See notes 110-13 supra and accompanying text.
115. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
116. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. In California, the
defendant must object in a timely manner. Id. In Payne, the court held that the
judge or defendant may initiate the challenge to the prosecutor's use of peremptories.
Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1040, 436 N.E.2d at 1050.
117. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. Taylor never referred to
"cognizable groups" as an element of the cross-section requirement. Courts, in gen-
eral, have not used consistent terminology to refer to groups that have been excluded
from one stage or another of jury service. Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge:
Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1735. "Cognizable,"
however, may be the most accurate term for describing those groups. Id. at 1735
n.83. Such groups are "defined in terms of any identifiable group characteristic that
results in its members sharing distinctive experiences and perspectives. The defining
characteristic should clearly identify any individual as within or without a group's
membership .... [T]he community's perception of it as a group makes its represen-
tation important to the legitimacy of the jury system." Id. at 1736-37.
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association rather than because of any specific bias." 11 8 If the defend-
ant successfully demonstrates this "strong likelihood" to the satisfac-
tion of the court, the prosecution is then allowed to present evidence
rebutting the defendant's prima facie case of systematic exclusion. " 9
The defendant's burden of a "strong likelihood"'120 of systematic
exclusion appears, on the surface, to be a stricter requirement than
Payne's "reasonably appears."' 2 1 Like Payne, Wheeler allows for a
showing of systematic exclusion in any particular case without requir-
ing that such exclusion be demonstrated in past cases. Wheeler does
not solve the problem of determining how many excluded jurors
establish a case of systematic exclusion. Wheeler does require a more
objective determination before the subjective view of the judge be-
comes a factor. 122
B. Justice Goldberg's View
A second, intermediate approach is that adopted by Justice
Goldberg's dissent in Swain. 2 3 Justice Goldberg relied on the "rule of
exclusion.' 1 24 This rule established certain criteria for determining
whether jury selection was conducted in a discriminatory manner. 125
Justice Goldberg considered the rule of exclusion to be pragmatic and
believed that it should not be limited only to the selection of the jury
panel. 12 6 When the criteria delineated by the rule of exclusion are
118. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. A specific bias
relates to the trial at hand or to the parties or witnesses at such trial. Id. at 276, 583
P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902. Such bias is not necessarily one for which a
challenge for cause could be exercised. Id. at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal. Rptr.
at 906.
119. Id. at 281, 583 P.2d at 764-65., 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
120. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
121. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1040, 436 N.E.2d at 1050. The Payne standards
have not yet been relied on outside the state of Illinois, and within the state, only one
case has followed Payne. People v. Gosberry, 109 Ill. App. 3d 674, 440 N.E. 2d 954,
958 (1982).
122. In California the prosecutor is not required to explain his use of peremptories
until the judge determines that the defendant has demonstrated a strong likelihood
that he has been discriminated against. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 765, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 905. In Illinois, when the judge determines that a reasonable appearance of
discrimination is established the prosecutor must explain his exercise of peremptory
challenges. 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1040, 436 N.E.2d at 1050.
123. 380 U.S. at 228 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 232. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
125. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1954). The rule of exclusion is still a
viable test in jury selection cases. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
126. Swain, 380 U.S. at 240 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). The Court has never
distinguished between exclusion from the jury venire and exclusion from the petit
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met 2 7 the state is obliged to demonstrate that it did not engage in
discriminatory jury selection.12 The Swain dissent rejected the major-
ity's requirement that the defendant prove the circumstances and
intent relating to the prosecutor's use of peremptories against mem-
bers of cognizable groups in earlier cases. 129 The majority and dissent
in Swain agree that some evidence of discrimination at earlier trials is
a prerequisite to a determination of systematic exclusion. 130 The
Swain dissent is more protective of the individual defendant, how-
ever, because it required less detail.13 '
C. The Van Dyke Approach
Other approaches for dealing with systematic exclusion through
peremptories call into question the value of the peremptory challenge
itself. Van Dyke suggests that in order to curtail misuses of the pe-
remptory challenge, the number of peremptories available to the
prosecution should be severely reduced. 32 This approach would re-
quire a prosecutor to be cautious with his exercise of peremptory
challenges. 133
jury. "Indeed, no such distinction can be drawn." Id. at 239. Application of the rule
of exclusion is "neither 'blind' nor 'wooden,' but is realistic" because the same facts
"exist whether exclusion from the jury panel or exclusion from the jury itself is
involved .. " Id. at 240.
127. The criteria are met when the group excluded is a significant portion of the
population, some members of the group were eligible for jury service, and no
member of the group had been called for jury service over a period of time. See note
53 supra.
128. 380 U.S. at 245 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 239 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). While the majority required the defend-
ant to provide details about the state's involvement in jury discrimination, id. at 224,
the dissent noted that the defendant's access to the relevant information is limited.
Id. at 240 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Justice Goldberg suggested that the rule of
exclusion is better able "to effectuate the Constitution's command." Id.
130. Id. "[W]here, as here, a Negro defendant proves that Negroes constitute a
substantial segment of the population, that Negroes are qualified to serve as jurors,
and that none or only a token number has served on juries over an extended period of
time, a prima facie case of the exclusion of Negroes from juries is then made
out .. ." Id. at 244-45. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text for Swain
requirements.
131. Justice Goldberg called for lower "barriers to the elimination of jury discrim-
ination," 380 U.S. at 231, and concluded that a prima facie case of systematic
exclusion existed on the basis of the facts in Swain. Id. at 237.
132. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 2, at 169. Van Dyke suggests this approach as the
best among several which he discusses. Id. at 167-69.
133. Although Van Dyke does not thoroughly explain why his solution is the best,
his rationale is apparent. Theoretically, a prosecutor would hesitate before using a
peremptory challenge based solely on a prospective juror's affiliation with a cogniza-
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Taking Van Dyke's theory to its extreme raises the possibility of
abolishing the peremptory challenge and expanding the causes articu-
lated in the "for cause"' 34 statutes. Since the peremptory challenge
historically has been subject to abuse, and its role has been ques-
tioned 35 it is arguable that their elimination would result in no great
loss. This assertion should be rejected, however, in light of the favor-
able functions that peremptory challenges serve for both sides of a
proceeding. 36 Challenges for cause, which traditionally deal with
only a few apparent biases, could not possibly encompass all the
reasons for exclusion that would be valid under a properly applied
peremptory challenges. Van Dyke's proposal for reducing the number
of peremptory challenges has validity, but it is flawed in that any
number of peremptory challenges may be used discriminatorily. Even
if the number of peremptories available is severely limited, the ulti-
mate problem persists. A procedure in which peremptory challenges
are subject to judicial scrutiny whenever the danger of abuse arises is
more likely to contribute to impartiality than is merely limiting the
number of peremptory challenges.
D. Synthesis of Wheeler and Payne
A synthesis of the Wheeler137 and Payne 38 guidelines establishes the
best approach among those recommended for determining systematic
exclusion. The defendant would be obliged to demonstrate that the
ble group when the prosecutor has only a few peremptories available to challenge
those jurors with an obvious, non-statutory bias.
134. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 27-40 supra and accompanying text.
136. Peremptory challenges allow the attorney to probe into the prospective ju-
rors' backgrounds while trying to ascertain bias; the attorney need not fear the
possibility that he will alienate a juror by conducting an extensive examination, or by
challenging a juror for cause. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (a
juror may be 'provoked' to the point of resentment by the attorney's questions).
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed its support for peremptory
challenges because peremptories allow counsel to exclude prospective jurors who
shield or conceal subtle biases which are not immediately apparent, but of which
counsel is cognizant. People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 548, 443 N.E.2d 915, 918,
457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (1982). See also Judge Fuchsberg's dissent in McCray, id. at
556, 558, 443 N.E.2d at 923, 924, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 449, 450 (peremptory challenges
"eradicate the smaller incidence of patent prejudice rather than the far greater one of
latent prejudice ...").
137. See notes 115-20 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Wheeler
approach.
138. See notes 110-12 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Payne
approach.
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excluded jurors were members of a cognizable group. 3 The jury's
function is frustrated if the impartial but peculiar views of a cogniza-
ble group are excluded. A segment of society is then prohibited from
sharing its unique perspective and understanding of events. 140 The
defendant might also follow a suggestion made in Wheeler by showing
that the prosecution used a disproportionate number of peremptories
to strike members of the cognizable group. ' 41 The significance of this
showing will vary greatly from case to case, but in no instance should
it be considered in isolation.
Next the defendant could be required to demonstrate that the back-
grounds of the excluded jurors do not reveal any basis for exclusion. 142
Statements made by jurors during voir dire which reveal traits of both
included and excluded jurors should be introduced. 143 The court can
compare these traits in order to determine whether characteristics of
the excluded jurors in any way justified the prosecutor's conclusion
that excluded jurors might have been biased.
Still another factor the court could consider is whether the prosecu-
tor's questions were sufficiently probative. 144 If counsel has relied
solely on superficial questioning to establish bias, the court has addi-
tional justification for considering the attorney's motives to be suspect.
Cursory examinations combined with a significantly higher propor-
tion of peremptory challenges against members of a cognizable group
provides further evidence to the court that the attorney was predis-
posed to exclude group members.
Proving each of these factors will be facilitated by a record of the
voir dire proceedings. The record will contain the exchange between
the prospective jurors and the questioning attorneys, and will note
against whom peremptory challenges were exercised. Therefore, an
opportunity to maintain a record of voir dire should be made avail-
able by the court to any defendant who requests it.
The factors suggested above are not conclusive of systematic exclu-
sion. They are proposed as elements contributing to the establishment
139. See note 117 supra.
140. "When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded
from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human
nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and
perhaps unknowable." Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (plurality opinion of
Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Stewart, JJ.).
141. 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
142. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
143. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
144. 22 Cal. 3d at 280-81, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
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of a prima facie case of discriminatory dismissals. A prima facie case is
established when the court is not satisfied that there is a reasonable
explanation for the prosecutor's inference that certain jurors may have
been biased.
Once a prima facie case has been established the prosecutor should
be given an opportunity to articulate the reasons for his conclusion
that a juror showed signs of impartiality.' 45 To prevent the state from
inventing reasons for exclusion the judge should be allowed to inquire
as to the specific actions or responses of the excluded jurors which gave
the impression of bias.' 46 The court then should accept the prosecu-
tor's explanation if it is not based solely on that juror's affiliation with
a cognizable group' 47 and if a reasonable attorney relying on the same
information would have deduced that a particular juror might be
biased. If, however, the state's explanation is insufficient on either of
these accounts, the court has persuasive evidence of systematic exclu-
sion.
There are several advantages to this proposal. Prosecutors will be
discouraged from using peremptories discriminatorily because defend-
ants will have a reasonable chance of successfully voiding an improp-
erly selected jury. Prosecutors will want to avoid beginning the jury
selection process anew.
The defendant's burden of proof, based on several specific consider-
ations is manageable. The fact that the county or the individual
prosecutor does not have a history of systematic exclusion is not, and
should not be, a factor in evaluating any individual's objection.' 48
Furthermore, the defendant is not required to conduct an exhaustive
search for evidence of past discriminatory practices at voir dire. '4
145. Swain,, Wheeler, Soares, and Payne all require this step. The state should be
allowed the opportunity to present facts on its behalf to rebut the conclusion that the
state acted improperly.
146. Judges can effectively evaluate the reasons submitted because they are famil-
iar with the conditions surrounding the trial and with the practices of the local
prosecutors. Kuhn, supra note 100, at 295.
147. See Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 281, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906 (to
justify the use of peremptory challenges the party allegedly misusing them must show
that group association was not the sole reason for excluding the jurors); see also Note,
Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, supra
note 117, at 1740 (demonstration of a prima facie case of discrimination "shift[s] the
burden to the allegedly offending party to show that its challenges were not exercised
on the basis of group association").
148. Swain requires a history of systematic exclusion by insisting that all claimants
prove that they are not the first victim of systematic exclusion. See notes 57-62 supra
and accompanying text. See also notes 93-97 supra and accompanying text for
criticisms of Swain.
149. "The defendant is party to only one criminal proceeding, and has no personal
experience of racial discrimination in the other trials held in that court. Nor can he
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Finally, this approach pays proper deference to defendants' consti-
tutional rights while preserving the essential integrity of the peremp-
tory challenge. The state is not required to explain itself until the
defendant has met his burden of proof. The burden requires enough
detail that a defendant's frivolous claim will not establish a prima
facie case and consequently will not require the prosecutor to justify
his use of the peremptory challenge. Also, the prosecutor's motives are
open to question only in those limited instances involving discrimina-
tion against cognizable groups. All other uses of peremptory chal-
lenges remain closed to scrutiny.
V. Conclusion
Recently, peremptory challenges have been exercised to systemati-
cally exclude cognizable groups from petit juries. Such practices un-
dermine the integrity of the sixth amendment's guarantee that juries
will represent a fair cross-section of the community. In order to
maintain the import of the constitutional guarantee, courts should not
feel restrained from inquiring into an attorney's motives when it
appears that peremptories have been applied discriminatorily. An
intrusion into the expanse of the peremptory challenge can be justified
if the result is the elimination of systematic exclusion and the facilita-
tion of more representative juries.
Stephen W. Dicker
easily'obtain such information. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 285, 583 P.2d at 767,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
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